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4
Commerce and Colonialism 
in Kant’s Philosophy of 
History
Lea Ypi
4.1 The Controversy about Kant and 
Commerce
Celebrated as a pioneer of liberal freedom and damned as an apologist of 
imperialism, Kant’s reflections on the role of race and commercial rela-
tions contain many ambiguities. On the one hand, Kant shares with his 
Enlightenment predecessors the appreciation of the virtues of the doux 
commerce and an emphasis on its role in promoting domestic stability and 
peace amongst nations (IaG 8:27). On the other hand, he applauds restric-
tions on trade and praises the protectionism of states like China and Japan 
in placing barriers on the import of foreign products (ZeF 8:359 and GTP 
8: 299n). Kant defends the ‘right’ to attempt to make commercial contact 
with distant others as an instance of universal cosmopolitan relations (ZeF 
8: 358), but he also insists that such right can never be imposed, despite 
the coercive nature that relations of right typically display (MdS 6: 353). 
In some of Kant’s writings the commercial spirit is praised for cultivating 
moral predispositions that will progressively bring about the enlighten-
ment of political institutions (IaG 8: 27–8). In others that very same spirit 
is scorned for fostering selfishness, cowardice, and a general debasement 
of human beings (KdU 5: 263).
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Given such disparate evaluations it is not surprising to see that those 
few critics who have explicitly engaged with Kant’s thoughts on race and 
commercial relations are as sharply divided on the matter as Kant him-
self appears to be. For some authors, Kant’s views of trade render him an 
all too typical representative of the Enlightenment expansionist model of 
civilization,1 insensitive to the diversity of non-European forms of life,2 
and complicit in racial discrimination and colonial exploitation.3 For 
others, to the contrary, Kant champions an anti-imperial discourse that 
places him side by side with progressive critics of European colonial pro-
jects, such that his theory of cosmopolitan right should be seen as a vehicle 
of empowerment and resistance to colonialism and domination.4 In one 
prominent reading, Kant is as much an apologist of unrestricted trade and 
free markets as his ‘beloved’ Adam Smith.5 In another one, Kant regarded 
‘just trade’ as more important than ‘free trade’, and his entire theory of 
international justice can be seen as an attempt to formulate the right way 
to engage in commerce with distant others.6
The purpose of this chapter is to revisit these debates by placing Kant’s 
reflections on race and commercial relations in the context of a system-
atic discussion of Kant’s philosophy of history, its teleological principles, 
and the related development of Kant’s theory of right and politics. It is 
well known that Kant’s views on teleology developed significantly during 
the 1790s, culminating in a new assessment of the role of the principle of 
1 See, for example, Anthony Pagden, ‘Stoicism, cosmopolitanism and the legacy of 
European imperialism’, Constellations 7, no. 1 (2000), pp. 3–22.
2 See Thomas McCarthy, Race, empire, and the idea of human development (Cambridge; 
New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009).
3 See Robert Bernasconi, ‘Who invented the concept of race? Kant’s role in the 
Enlightenment construction of race’, in Race ed. Robert Bernasconi (Oxford:  Blackwell, 
2001), pp. 11–36; C. W. Mills, ‘Kant’s Untermenschen’, in Race and racism in modern philoso-
phy, ed. A. Valls (Cornell: Cornell University Press, 2005), pp. 169–193.
4 See, for example, Sankar Muthu, Enlightenment against empire (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2003); and Sankar Muthu, ‘Conquest, commerce, and cosmopolitanism in 
Enlightenment political thought’, in Empire and modern political thought, ed. Sankar Muthu 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), pp. 199–231; Peter Niesen, ‘Hospitality and 
colonialism’, Politics and Ethics Review 3, no. 1 (2007), pp. 90–108.
5 S. Fleischacker, ‘Values behind the market: Kant’s response to the “Wealth of Nations” ’, 
History of Political Thought 17, no. 3 (1996), pp. 379–407. The idea that Kant had referred to 
Smith as his ‘liebling’ philosopher, comes from a letter of Marcus Herz, written in 1771 (Brief 
10: 126).
6 Pauline Kleingeld, Kant and cosmopolitanism: The philosophical ideal of world citizen-
ship (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), pp. 124–48.
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conformity to ends in the Critique of the Power of Judgement.7 It is also 
well known that this development had important implications for a num-
ber of areas of Kant’s philosophy, including his political philosophy.8 Until 
now however, few attempts have been made to explain what exactly moti-
vated these revisions from a systematic perspective and where they lead 
the overall assessment of Kant’s account of colonialism and commercial 
relations.9
The present chapter examines such a neglected link by focusing on the 
development of the concept of ‘predispositions’ (Anlage) and its place in 
Kant’s philosophy of history. The concept is interesting as an entry-point 
to Kant’s earlier account of the relation between nature and freedom; it also 
plays a central role in motivating Kant’s defence of commercial relations as 
the sort of social relation that naturally grows with the development of 
the ‘predisposition’ to ‘unsocial sociability’ (ungesellige Geselligkeit). The 
following pages analyse that predisposition by placing it in the context of 
a wider eighteenth-century philosophical debate about the role of natu-
ral predispositions (Anlagen), and the related concept of ‘germs’ (Keime), 
in explaining the persistence or transformation of particular traits of the 
human species. As we shall see in what follows, Kant’s remarks matured in 
the context of a preformist view of organic development that conceded the 
plausibility of natural teleology to illustrate the development of humans as 
a species, and linked this to a qualified endorsement of the physical theo-
logical proof for the existence of God. His earlier defence of commercial 
relations therefore cannot be understood without examining how this 
account of the predisposition to unsocial sociability is related to a teleol-
ogy of nature with important implications for Kant’s hierarchical account 
of human races and their development in different societies. Conversely, 
Kant’s later sceptical stance on both colonialism and commercial relations 
7 I have discussed this issue in Lea Ypi, ‘Natura daedala rerum? On the justification of 
historical progress in Kant’s guarantee of perpetual peace’, Kantian Review 14, no. 2 (2010), 
pp. 118–48.
8 This last claim has been made persuasively by Pauline Kleingeld, who argues that Kant’s 
views on race, for example, significantly changed after 1792: see Pauline Kleingeld, ‘Kant’s 
second thoughts on race’, Philosophical Quarterly 57, no. 229 (2007), pp. 573–92. Although she 
suggests that the change might be related both to the influence of the French Revolution and 
to developments in Kant’s philosophy of biology, she does not pursue the thought further.
9 One exception is Ian Storey, ‘Nature’s law and empire in Kant’s “second thoughts” on 
race’ History of Political Thoughts (forthcoming). For a discussion of the role of nature for 
Kant’s critique of colonialisms, see Muthu, Enlightenment against empire: pp. 135–138.
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makes sense in the light of his mature reflective approach to the question 
of natural teleology, the abandonment of physical theology in the third 
Critique, and the related separation of the moral from the natural realm 
when it comes to the standing of different human beings and their societal 
development.
4.2 Unsocial Sociability, Teleology and 
Nature
As many interpreters have emphasized, Kant’s earlier thoughts on the role 
of trade interdependence in relation to the promotion of peace are con-
tinuous with a tradition that links the expansion of commercial sociability 
to the promotion of public order and the development of cosmopolitan 
political relations.10 Like Vitoria, Pufendorf, Wolff, and Vattel before him, 
Kant saw the predisposition to communication as an effective antidote to a 
radically pessimistic view of human nature and to the prospects for politi-
cal order following from it. In Vitoria and others the natural inclination to 
communicate and the right to enter in commercial relations served to jus-
tify imperial expansion and the right to subjugate non-European peoples 
on grounds that they violated the natural duty to behave hospitably to for-
eign travellers.11 Although the link between the right to make commercial 
offers, colonialism, and cosmopolitanism is examined in much greater 
detail in Kant’s later writings, it is worth emphasizing that in the earlier 
stages of his work he was not too distant from his predecessors’ remarks.
One potential source of evidence is his 1784 essay Idea for universal his-
tory from a cosmopolitan perspective. Kant’s analysis of the role of unso-
cial sociability of human beings and the sympathetic remarks on the 
commercial spirit that accompany it is particularly clear in two distinct 
passages. The first is when Kant discusses the transition from the state of 
nature amongst human beings to a condition of freedom under external 
laws guaranteed by state institutions. The second is when he examines the 
dynamic of antagonistic relations between states and the conditions under 
which a lasting peace can be achieved.
10 See, for one example, Pagden’s contribution to this volume.
11 See for an excellent discussion of this point, Pagden, ‘Stoicism, cosmopolitanism and 
the legacy of European imperialism’.
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With regard to the first, Kant’s defence of commercial relations arises in 
the context of his attempt to identify a pattern of collective development 
showing that human beings’ moral predispositions can be realized in the 
historical world. This can occur through the achievement of an instituted 
political society able to administer justice universally (IaG 8:  22). This 
problem, however, is also difficult to solve: the human being ‘is an animal 
[. . .] which needs a master’ yet ‘this master is exactly as much an animal 
who has need of a master’ (IaG 8: 23). The fact that the highest author-
ity needed to realize humanity’s moral predispositions ought to be ‘just in 
itself and yet a human being’ is a problem that appears in fact impossible 
to solve: ‘out of such crooked wood as humanity is made, nothing entirely 
straight can be fabricated’ (IaG 8: 16). If human agents are thus challenged 
in the ability fully to realize their own moral potential, only an approxima-
tion to the ideal can be expected.
Kant is sceptical here that political expedients are sufficient to bring 
about even an approximation to the ideal of universal justice. He lays his 
hopes instead on the benign intervention of ‘nature’ which has willed that 
‘human beings produce everything that goes beyond their mechanical 
existence out of their own labour and hands’. Reflecting on the potential 
for moral progress in the course of human development, he defends the 
relevance of a teleological perspective for understanding an otherwise 
meaningless aggregate of human actions as a system where the devel-
opment of the parts promotes the organic unity of the whole.12 Nature, 
Kant argues, ‘is not superfluous and is not wasteful in the use of means to 
its ends’ (IaG 8:19). It has willed that ‘human beings produce everything 
that goes beyond their mechanical existence out of their own labour and 
hands’. In providing tools for their own development, everything has been 
tightly calculated so that the human being can only credit himself one day 
for reaching ‘the height of the greatest skillfullness, the inner perfection of 
his mode of thought and (as far as it is possible on earth) thereby happi-
ness’ (IaG 8:19).
12 On the relevance of teleological principles for distinguishing between aggregate and 
system and the role of the latter in Kant’s philosophy, see Lea Ypi, ‘The problem of systematic 
unity in Kant’s two definitions of philosophy’, in Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher 
Absicht. Akten des XI. Kant-Kongresses 2010, ed. Stefano Bacin, et al. (Berlin: De Gryter, 2013), 
vol. 1, pp. 773–786.
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Kant appeals to the important concept of ‘predisposition’ (Anlage) to 
unsociable sociability (ungesellige Geselligkeit) to explain how nature inter-
venes to promote humanity’s moral principles (IaG 8: 23). Indeed, he goes 
as far as praising the commercial spirit for facilitating the unfolding of that 
predisposition. ‘Thanks be to nature [. . .] for the incompatibility, for the 
spiteful competitive vanity, for the insatiable desire to possess or even to 
dominate!’ he emphatically asserts (IaG 8: 21). The selfish instincts that 
accompany commercial sociability, the desire for competition, acquisi-
tion of property, the investment of labour and resources, are revealed in 
this context to form part of a productive cycle that turns human unso-
ciability into a motor of social progress. Although human beings wish to 
lead a quiet and comfortable life, ‘nature wills that out of sloth and inactive 
contentment he should throw himself into labor and toils, so as, on the 
contrary, prudently to find out the means to pull himself again out of the 
latter’. This Kant, argues, betrays ‘the ordering of a wise creator; and not 
the hand of an evil spirit who might have bungled his splendid undertak-
ing or ruined it in an envious manner’ (IaG 8:21).
Promoting a social order in which commercial relations are instrumen-
tally valuable to the development of political institutions guaranteeing 
security and the undisturbed enjoyment of private property is not the only 
instance in which the predisposition to unsocial sociability appears as an 
integral part of nature’s beneficial intervention in history. Kant’s remarks 
on the role of trade for the development of such predisposition become 
even more incisive when we turn to the second dimension of antagonism 
examined in Idea: conflict amongst states and the general condition of 
enlightenment that such conflict brings with it. Indeed, trade is explicitly 
mentioned in the eighth proposition of the 1784 essay stating that the his-
tory of the human species could be viewed as the completion of a ‘hidden 
plan of nature’ to promote an internal and external perfect state constitu-
tion. Asking whether experience reveals anything that might allow us to 
make conjectures about the development of human beings in this direc-
tion, Kant identifies promising signs in the commercial interdependence 
of all states and the degree of enlightenment amongst both politicians and 
citizens that such civilized relations bring about. Culture, understood as 
a process of sophistication of both material and social habits in response 
to ever more complex human needs, plays a crucial role here too. States, 
Kant argues, ‘are already in such an artificial relation to each other that 
none of them can neglect its internal cultural development without losing 
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power and influence among the others’. Moreover, ‘civil freedom cannot 
be very well infringed without feeling the disadvantage of it in all trades, 
especially in commerce, and thereby also the diminution of the powers of 
the state in its external relationships’ (IaG 8: 27).
Kant then links the possibility of the human species making moral pro-
gress to the predisposition to unsocial sociability and the commercial spirit 
that drives social cooperation beyond internal conflicts within the state. 
Provided one respects mutual constraints on freedom, if ‘one hinders the 
citizen who is seeking his welfare in any way he pleases, as long as it can 
subsist along with the freedom [. . .] then one restrains the vitality of all 
enterprise and with it, in turn, the powers of the whole’ (IaG 8: 29). This ref-
erence to the value of individual welfare and the appeal to the laissez-faire 
attitude required to let individuals pursue their own ends as they see fit is 
very important. In later writings, Kant makes a structurally similar argu-
ment, emphasizing the interdependence of human actions and their 
importance for political institutions, yet the value cited as foundational to 
explain how agents are connected to each other beyond national bounda-
ries is justice rather than individual welfare. I shall return to this point in 
the following pages; for now it is important to notice that the predisposi-
tion to unsocial sociability plays a crucial role in Kant’s teleological narra-
tive of how the selfish pursuit of private gains might promote the right kind 
of political institutions. Once that teleological narrative is revisited and sys-
tematic emphasis is placed on the role of agents’ reflecting about their own 
position in human history, the assessment of commercial relations and the 
evaluation of the role of the state will also end up being reshaped.
But before analysing that point, and to return to the earlier essay on 
history, it is important to pay attention to how Kant describes the politi-
cal processes triggered by the development of commercial sociability. The 
argument is of an elitist kind. Kant draws attention to the role of monarchs 
in removing barriers on their citizens’ personal initiatives for the promo-
tion of commercial interaction. He argues that the enlightenment of civil 
society will one day reach them too:
Hence the personal restrictions on the citizen’s doing and refraining are removed 
more and more, and the general freedom of religion is ceded; and thus gradually 
arises, accompanied by delusions and whims, enlightenment, as a great good that 
must raise humankind even out of the selfish aims of aggrandizement on the part 
of its rulers, if only the latter understand their own advantage. This enlightenment, 
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however, and with it also a certain participation in the good by the heart of the enlight-
ened human being who understands the good perfectly, must ascend bit by bit up to 
the thrones and have its influence even on their principles of government. (IaG 8: 29)
Kant does not say exactly what sort of principles and governments are 
required to promote a process of ‘enlightenment’ which is described here 
in rather general terms. He defends a more specific definition of the term 
in his famous article ‘What is Enlightenment?’ in which he also stresses the 
importance of removing obstacles to freedom in order to guarantee the pub-
lic use of reason (WiA 8: 37). Interestingly, he there defends the freedom to 
pursue commercial initiatives through an important distinction between the 
private and the public use of reason applied to the potential injustice of taxa-
tion. Although a citizen cannot in his private capacity refuse to pay the taxes 
imposed on him, Kant argues, ‘the same citizen does not act against the duty 
of citizen, when, as a scholar, he publicly expresses his thoughts about the 
inappropriateness or even injustice of such decrees’ (WiA 8:37). The critique 
of taxation in the Enlightenment essay therefore complements the defence of 
commercial relations presented in Idea for a universal history and indicates a 
sympathetic stance towards unrestricted commercial relations.
Moreover, like many of his predecessors, Kant’s analysis of the 
Enlightenment is at this point not hostile to the idea of European civiliza-
tion spreading to the rest of the globe. He argues that if one approaches 
the study of history in a systematic fashion, ‘one will discover a regular 
course of improvement in our part of the world’ and that this part of the 
world ‘will probably someday give laws to all others’ (IaG 8: 29). He iden-
tifies the means for such development in the expansion of the commer-
cial spirit and the benefits of international trade on the relations between 
states. The selfish instincts that accompany commercial sociability, the 
desire for competition, acquisition of property, the investment of labour 
and resources, are revealed (and justified) in this context as part of a pro-
ductive cycle that turns the predisposition to human unsocial sociability 
into a motor of social progress.
4.3 The Teleology of Racial Hierarchy and 
Commercial Relations
In examining these passages it is important to emphasize that the posi-
tion concerning the effects of commercial society and the expansion of the 
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European model is not one that Kant takes without passing judgement.13 
Rather, the account of race endorsed throughout the 1770s and early 1780s 
suggests that Kant approved of European attempts to dominate the rest of 
the world and genuinely believed that other populations were unable to 
rule themselves.14 As the notes from his lectures on anthropology from 
1780 to 1781 illustrate, he thought that ‘Americans and Negroes cannot 
govern themselves’; ‘they serve only as slaves’, and are similar to ‘children’ 
(VA 25: 877–8). In his 1788 essay on the use of teleological principles in 
philosophy, he cites approvingly a ‘knowledgeable man’ who criticized 
the proposal to emancipate slaves on grounds that when they are set free, 
‘they soon abandon an easy craft which previously as slaves they had been 
forced to carry out, and instead become hawkers, wretched innkeepers, 
lackeys, and people who go fishing and hunting, in a word tramps’ (TTP 
8:174n).
Kant’s hierarchical view of human races and the analysis of unsocial 
sociability on which his defence of commercial relations is based are 
clearly connected. But in what way? To illuminate that connection we 
need to consider the systematic role that the concepts of ‘predisposition’ 
(Anlage) and germs (Keime) play in Kant’s philosophy of nature and his 
account of the generation of organisms. The first of these, the concept of 
predisposition, is one that, as we saw, Kant also introduces to explain how 
unsocial sociability is at the heart of processes that trigger the appropriate 
kinds of social relations, thus preparing the way for the development of 
morality. The second, the concept of germs, plays a particularly important 
role in Kant’s analysis of the human race.
Both germs and predispositions are systematically introduced in the 
context of a familiar eighteenth-century debate about the unity of the spe-
cies and the modality of transmission of character traits from one gen-
eration of organisms to the next. To better understand their relevance to 
Kant’s teleology of nature, we need to turn to the trilogy of essays in which 
the natural history of human beings is explicitly discussed: Of the different 
13 I disagree here with the position Sankar Muthu takes in Muthu, Enlightenment against 
empire: p. 186. The idea that Kant’s views should be understood as a simple matter of fact 
statement and contain no evaluative features has also been defended by Todd Hedrick, ‘Race, 
difference, and anthropology in Kant’s cosmopolitanism’, Journal of the History of Philosophy 
46 (2008): pp. 245–268, at p. 262.
14 For an excellent discussion of this point, see Pauline Kleingeld’s contribution to this 
volume.
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races of human beings (1775), Determination of the concept of a human 
race (1785) and On the use of teleological principles in philosophy (1788). 
Enquiring upon the reasons for the origin of different races, Kant offers 
the following explanation:
The grounds of a determinate unfolding which are lying in the nature of an organic 
body (plant or animal) are called germs, if this unfolding concerns particular parts; 
if however it concerns only the size or the relation of parts to one another, then 
I call them natural predispositions. [. . .] This care of Nature to equip her creature 
through hidden inner provisions for all kinds of future circumstances, so that 
it may preserve itself and be suited to the difference of the climate or the soil, is 
admirable. [. . .] Chance or the universal mechanical laws could not produce such 
agreements. Therefore we must consider such occasional unfoldings as preformed. 
(VRM 2: 435)
Kant’s remarks on germs and predispositions are here situated in the 
context of a longstanding eighteenth-century scientific debate among 
defenders of epigenetic theories of natural development versus preform-
ist accounts. The former, revived in the eighteenth century in the defence 
of ‘mechanistic’ epigenesis offered by G. L. L. Buffon’s Histoire naturelle 
générale et particulière that appeared in 1749 explained organic develop-
ment by referring to the action of a moule intérieure, a kind of vital force 
understood in analogy with the Newtonian microforces, which organized 
the interaction of the various molécules organiques of which living mat-
ter was composed.15 Therefore the generation of new organisms was here 
illustrated with reference to a capacity inherent in matter to transform 
itself and generate new organic forms. Preformist accounts, on the other 
hand, developed in a climate of scepticism about epigenetic theories. They 
gained particular prominence in Germany through the work of Albrecht 
von Haller, later also reinforced by the analysis and microscopic obser-
vations of the Swiss naturalist Charles Bonnet. Both Haller and Bonnet, 
refined existing accounts of preformation by referring to the existence of 
preformed germs which were thought to be present in all natural beings 
that contained the seeds for their future development. Germs therefore 
pre-existed the fully formed organism, not in the sense that all the proper-
ties of a fully formed organism could be interpreted as already developed 
15 See Phillip Sloan, ‘Preforming the categories: Eighteenth-century generation theory 
and the biological roots of Kant’s a-priori’, Journal of the History of Philosophy 40, no. 2 (Apr. 
2002): pp. 229–253.
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in the germs, but as seeds which required an ordering cause to facilitate 
their growth. Preformist theorists like Haller and Bonnet could thus 
respond to both biological and theological disputes about the relation of 
God to living matter, reconciling the natural development of organic parts 
with the defence of a purposeful intervention in the way natural forces 
with innate teleological direction could organize and develop.16
Although, as many interpreters have pointed out, Kant’s general posi-
tion towards epigenesis is complex (in the first Critique he went as far as 
calling the entire system ‘an epigenesis of pure reason’ (KrV 3: B 167), his 
commitment to a version of preformation is consistently clear in his early 
writings, and particularly in his essays on race.17 Already his 1763 work on 
the Only Possible Proof of the Existence of God had illustrated Kant’s famili-
arity with these different theories of generation, and indeed displayed an 
attempt to go beyond both epigenetic and preformist theories to elaborate 
a more sophisticated defence of physico-theological proof for the exist-
ence of God. It is in the context of his search for such proof that the con-
cept of predispositions (Anlage) is mentioned for the first time:
One presumes not only in inorganic, but also in organized Nature a greater neces-
sary unity than directly meets the eye. Because even in the structure of an animal 
it is to be supposed that a single predisposition [Anlage] will have a fertile adapt-
ability for many advantageous results, for which we might initially find necessary a 
plurality of special arrangements. Attention to this is as appropriate to philosophy 
as to the physico-theological inference. (Bew 2: 126)
The use of the term ‘Anlage’ is here not very different from the one we 
find in Kant’s later essays on race and in his account of commercial rela-
tions. But it is interesting to observe Kant’s insistence that a deeper under-
standing of the teleological potential of predispositions will make clearer 
the link between the teleology of natural forms and the attempt to infer 
from that link an intelligent designer of the universe (physico-theology). 
In the later essays on race, the definition and technical use of the concepts 
of germs and predispositions are unchanged. Here, too, Kant notes that 
germs and predispositions should be understood as purposive conditions 
16 For an excellent review of the thought of different authors involved in such contro-
versies, see John H.  Zammito, ‘Kant’s persistent ambivalence towards epigenesis, 1764–
1790’, in Understanding purpose: Kant and the philosophy of biology, ed. Philippe Huneman 
(Rochester:  University of Rochester Press, 2007), pp. 51–74 and Sloan, ‘Preforming the 
categories’.
17 For further analysis of this issue see Sloan, ‘Preforming the categories’.
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for the development of natural beings that specify their capacity to adapt 
and survive in particular environmental and atmospheric conditions. 
They represent innate structures, independent of mechanical causes, 
which precede the empirical development of organisms yet contain the 
seeds for their future growth and allow them to adapt in different environ-
ments (VRM 2:435). As Kant puts it, ‘the human being was destined for all 
climates and for every soil’ and ‘consequently various germs and natural 
predispositions had to lie ready in him to be on occasion either unfolded 
or restrained, so that he would become suited to his place in the world and 
over the course of the generations would appear to be as it were native to 
and made for that place’ (VRM 2:435).
These reflections are particularly useful in understanding how Kant 
ends up solving the core theoretical problem faced by his essays on 
race: explaining the diversity of human races whilst also tracing them all 
back to the same human species. Faced with the usual difficulties of invok-
ing mechanical laws to analyse the unity of a species and explain how the 
characteristics of a particular organism could be preserved and transmit-
ted to the next generation, a version of ‘preformist’ theories is endorsed to 
account for the evolution of human traits that are already contained in it 
as germs and predispositions. Yet, while predispositions refer to certain 
conditions of development with regard to the size and relation of parts 
(organs) in a living being, germs are conditions for the development of 
new features.18 This then allows Kant to explain the unity and the diver-
sity of the human species as well as its capacity to adapt to external differ-
ent circumstances. Different races develop as a result of different germs 
coming into contact with different environments. Predispositions, on the 
other hand, provide the structural conditions under which the develop-
ment of certain germs could be occasioned. They are therefore the same 
for the whole human species.
The implications of this theory are crucial for understanding Kant’s 
analysis of the historical development of the human species, the sort 
of relations humans develop in the course of adapting to different 
18 See for clarification of this distinction, Zammito, ‘Kant’s persistent ambivalence 
towards epigenesis, 1764–1790’ and Gunther Zoeller, ‘Kant on the generation of meta-
physical knowledge’, in Kant: Analysen, Probleme, Kritik, ed. Hariolf Oberer and Gerhard 
Seel (Würzburg: Koenigshausen & Neumann, 1988), pp. 71–90, at p. 75. For a discussion 
of Kant’s preformism in relation to his philosophy of biology, see also Philippe Huneman, 
Metaphysique et biologie: Kant et la constitution du concept d’organisme (Paris: Kime, 2008).
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environments, and the reason for his racially differentiated theory of com-
mercial development. Kant explains how germs account for the different 
characteristics inherited by every race within the same human species, but 
also emphasizes how the influence of a particular environment, the char-
acter of the soil or certain atmospheric conditions establish differences in 
human traits. Therefore germs serve to explain biological, physical, cog-
nitive, and also moral differences inherited by representatives of various 
races, whereas predispositions are shared by all human beings but can 
develop more slowly or more quickly depending on the empirical circum-
stances in which they evolve.
One such predisposition, central to the topic we are examining here, 
is that of ‘unsocial sociability’ which, as we saw earlier, should also be 
understood as the means deployed by nature to facilitate progress toward 
a civilized condition. Kant’s theory of racial hierarchy and his stadial nar-
rative of human history are related: if the theory of germs (Keime) explains 
the different abilities of human races, the Anlage to ‘unsocial sociabil-
ity’ will develop to a greater or lesser extent, depending on how different 
agents operate in different geographical and cultural environments. Kant 
implicitly refers to this issue when he discusses the capacity to work on 
the side of people with different skin colour. ‘Especially interwoven with 
certain natural predispositions’, he argues, are ‘in addition to the faculty to 
work . . . an immediate drive to activity (especially to the sustained activ-
ity that one calls industry), which is independent of all enticement’ (TTP 
8: 174n). Yet, non-whites have not only different individual skills but are 
also unable to produce ‘culture’.19 And this lack of ability, Kant explains 
elsewhere, is due to the different development of innate germs and predis-
positions: ‘Who[ever] has seen a savage Indian or Greenlander, should he 
indeed believe that there is a germ innate to this same [being] to become 
as a man in accordance with Parisian fashion [would become]? He has, 
however, the same germs as a civilized human being, only they are not yet 
developed’ (VA 25: 651).
The teleological constitution of human beings is therefore intrinsically 
related to the teleological constitution of nature and has important impli-
cations for humanity’s prospects of historical development. Human his-
tory is seen as the process of realization of predispositions and germs that 
19 For an excellent discussion of the development of Kant’s views on race in relation to his 
account of teleology, see Storey, ‘Nature’s law and empire in Kant’s “second thoughts” on race’.
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are innately implanted in natural organisms, and can only be explained 
in light of this assumption of natural conformity to ends. This principle 
reveals, in the writings of the early Kant, how the predisposition to ‘unso-
cial sociability’, which obtains its maximal development in commercial 
societies, is instrumental to nature’s positive role in the course of human 
history. Once we understand human history as a process of development 
of such predispositions, we can explain Kant’s commitment to applaud-
ing certain activities that promote the refinement of certain talents and 
skills and his unproblematic endorsement of Europe’s mission to expose 
other peoples to the same beneficial effects. History is presented here as a 
meaningful succession of human actions rather than a meaningless series 
of destructive events; nature and freedom are interpreted in a harmonic 
relation that allows the former to be a condition for the further develop-
ment of the latter.
But how can purposiveness in nature determine the course of human 
history without somehow undermining the capacity of human beings to 
freely pose their autonomous ends? Kant’s theory of germs and predis-
positions seeks to solve the difficult problem of the relationship between 
natural and moral teleology by introducing the idea of natural condi-
tions for development able to account for both immutability and change 
in the course of human history. Yet, as we saw, they are also linked to 
long-standing debates on the possibility to infer from such teleological 
constitution of nature, the existence of an intelligent designer of the uni-
verse as required by the physic-theological proof to which Kant explicitly 
refers. But the status of the assumption of intelligent intervention in the 
course of human history is empirically dubious and normatively problem-
atic: if natural teleology is to be understood as the condition of possibility 
for the development of preformed predispositions, freedom and with it 
the space for moral agency end up being significantly restricted.
Needless to say, the consequences of this question for Kant’s moral phi-
losophy are enormous. The problem that I have only sketched here tor-
ments Kant for a number of years and leads to the lengthy analysis on the 
status of reflective judgement in the third Critique. There Kant returns to 
talk about predispositions in order to distinguish organic beings from 
mechanical ones. However, and very strikingly, there are no longer any ref-
erences to the concept of Keime, which as we saw played an important role 
in Kant’s qualified endorsement of preformationism and in his explanation 
of differentiated human development. Although Kant maintains some 
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references to the concept of natural predispositions, they are now seen as 
‘inner purposive predispositions’ [inneren zweckmässigen Anlagen] and 
integrated with an epigenetic account of generation.20 And what is even 
more important for purposes of this chapter, Kant now makes it clear that 
this analysis of biological organisms has no moral implications: it is only 
possible to refer to ends of nature, not because nature is as such teleologi-
cally oriented, but in analogy with the kind of action conforming to ends 
that human beings exhibit in the practical realm.
The systematic implications of this development are subject to a vast 
interpretive literature and I have discussed them in greater detail else-
where.21 Without repeating them here, let us consider the re-assessment 
of the place of commercial relations in Kant’s later writings, once the 
assumption that the predisposition to unsocial sociability is best devel-
oped by nature in commercial societies is revealed to be untenable.
4.4 Commercial Relations in Kant’s Later 
Political Philosophy
The systematic developments of the third Critique in Kant’s analysis of 
teleology have immediate implications for a number of important issues 
in his political writings. Conformity to ends is understood in the third 
Critique not as a feature of nature but as a reflective quality ascribed by 
human beings to the development of some of nature’s products in analogy 
with the causality of freedom displayed in the practical realm. Nature, for 
Kant, is no longer in itself teleologically oriented. Rather, human beings 
can interpret it as such once they examine their own position in it and 
observe the analogy with the way they make use of its products to promote 
their practical ends.
It is therefore unsurprising to see that the assumption that unsocial 
sociability represents a predisposition that nature’s benign intervention 
can further develop appears less persuasive to him at this stage. As Kant 
emphasizes in the third Critique, ‘[i] t is so far from being the case that 
nature has made the human being its special favorite and favored him 
20 Under the influence of Johann Blumenbach, Kant distances himself from preformism 
and seems to endorse a version of epigenesis. For further analysis of this argument, see Sloan, 
‘Preforming the categories’.
21 Ypi, ‘Natura daedala rerum?’.
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with beneficence above all other animals, that it has rather spared him 
just as little as any other animal from its destructive effects, whether of 
pestilence, hunger, danger of flood, cold, attacks by other animals great 
and small’ (KdU 5: 430). This means that once the moral implications of 
the theory of predispositions disappear it is implausible to maintain that 
the conditions for development of human nature are determined by the 
beneficial intervention of a providential force. With this assumption, the 
physico-theological proof of the existence of God also disappears from 
Kant’s mature body of work.22
This development implies a re-evaluation of a number of key conceptual 
elements that played an important role in Kant’s earlier narrative of moral 
progress and the consequent defence of commercial relations within a 
stadial theory of human history. The first of these elements is the idea of 
a harmonious relation between the predisposition to unsocial sociability 
of human beings and nature’s intervention to promote this predisposition 
in a way that is conducive to the development of morality. In the essay 
on universal history, the predisposition to unsocial sociability develops 
in externally favourable circumstances in the context of an optimistic, if 
hierarchical, narrative of the transformation of the human species. The 
concept of happiness, the pursuit of which characterizes the commercial 
spirit, plays an essential role in explaining how nature has given human 
beings the means to promote their own skills and abilities so that what-
ever level of moral development they have achieved in the course of their 
lives could only be credited to themselves (IaG 8:19–20). To this end, com-
petitive instincts, the desire to possess, and the will to dominate others are 
seen as vehicles through which predispositions are further developed and 
reveal the ordering of a ‘wise creator’.
In the third Critique however, Kant is critical of the logic underpinning 
these links. Not only do these natural predispositions not stand in natural 
harmony with nature, but the conflict between them is so profound that ‘even 
if the most beneficent nature outside of us had made the happiness of our 
species its end, that end would not be attained in a system of nature upon the 
earth, because the nature inside us is not receptive to that’ (KdU 5: 430). All 
the instincts Kant cites favourably in the earlier essay on history to show how 
22 See on this issue Lea Ypi, ‘Teleology and system in Kant’s architectonic of pure rea-
son’, in Politics and Metaphysics in Kant, ed. by H. Williams, S. Baiasu, and S. Philstrom 
(Cardiff: University of Wales Press 2011), pp. 134–151.
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nature can turn the predisposition to unsocial sociability into a feature that is 
beneficial to moral progress (‘the oppression of domination’, ‘the barbarism 
of war’) are now mentioned to illustrate the resistance that human nature 
poses to such teleological intervention, even assuming its plausibility.
It is unsurprising therefore to see that at this point Kant’s assessment of 
the role of the commercial spirit has also changed. Commercial sociabil-
ity, which was once praised for contributing to a state of affairs in which 
conflict between states would gradually lead to peaceful solutions, is now 
contrasted with the spirit of war, but Kant expresses surprising admira-
tion for the sublimity of the latter. As he puts it, war, ‘if it is conducted 
with order and reverence for the rights of civilians, has something sub-
lime about it, and at the same time makes the mentality of the people who 
conduct it in this way all the more sublime, the more dangers it has been 
exposed to and before which it has been able to assert its courage’. On the 
contrary, he continues, ‘a long peace causes the spirit of mere commerce 
to predominate, along with base selfishness, cowardice and weakness, and 
usually debases the mentality of the populace’ (KU 5: 263).
These are not isolated remarks. The observations on the sublimity of 
war and the accompanying derision of the spirit of commerce that we 
find in the Critique of Judgement resonate with Kant’s other writings of 
the 1790s. In The conflict of the faculties, Kant refers to the revolutionary 
wars fought by France against defenders of the Ancient Regime to contrast 
the enthusiasm of those who fight to promote justice with the incentives 
obtained by monetary rewards. The latter, Kant says,
will not elevate the adversaries of the revolution to the zeal and grandeur of soul 
which the pure concept of right produced in them; and even the concept of honor 
among the old martial nobility (an analogue to enthusiasm) vanished before the 
weapons of those who kept in view the right of the nation to which they belonged 
and of which they considered themselves the guardians. (SdF 7; 86)23
These remarks fit neatly with Kant’s modified account of the process 
through which moral predispositions are historically developed. War, 
provided it is compatible with the pursuit of the principle of right, brings 
with it enthusiasm, a motive which characterizes the sublime state of mind 
and elevates the human spirit to acknowledge the force of the moral law. 
The revolutionary struggle of the French against a backward and corrupt 
23 See also in relation to this and to the assessment of war the following passage in 
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enemy triggers enthusiasm on the side of those who observe their deeds 
and could be interpreted as a ‘sign’ that human beings can make progress 
towards the better.24 In The Conflict of the Faculties, Kant examines the 
issue of progress, not by relying on evidence of the contribution of nature 
to the development of human predispositions, but by examining what 
human beings themselves do to create a social order in which justice is 
promoted. This is compatible with his remarks on the foundation of tele-
ological principles in the third Critique: culture is no longer understood 
here as the process through which nature assists the human being in the 
progressive development of his skills and abilities but as the ‘aptitude for 
setting himself ends at all and (independent from nature in his determina-
tion of ends) using nature as a means appropriate to the maxims of his free 
ends in general’ (KdU 5: 431).
In the third Critique, Kant analyses the process of cultural development 
of human beings in a way that appears structurally similar to the earlier 
essay on history but differs at several critical points. Here too Kant consid-
ers inequality amongst human beings an incentive for the advancement of 
industry and the arts, the development of talents, and the spread of luxury 
among the population of commercial states. Whilst he preserves his praise 
for the beautiful arts and sciences and their contribution to the refinement 
of taste and the reduction of ‘the tyranny of sensible tendencies’, he appears 
more critical of the effects of trade relations and the inequality they trig-
ger. Indeed, far from being praised as a ‘source of much greater evil but 
also of all good’, inequality is here considered as an immediate cause of 
political conflict and social disruption. Luxury, defined as ‘the tendency 
of what is dispensable to destroy what is indispensable’, is blamed for pro-
ducing calamities affecting both those who provide ‘the majority of the 
necessities of life [. . .] for the comfort and ease of others’ and those who 
Perpetual Peace: ‘War itself, however, needs no special motive but seems to be engrafted onto 
human nature and even to hold as something noble, to which the human being is impelled by 
the drive to honor without self-seeking incentives, so that military courage is judged (by the 
American savages as well as by the European savages in the age of chivalry) to be of imme-
diately great worth, not only if there is war (as would be reasonable) but also in order that 
there may be war, and war is often begun merely in order to display courage; hence an inner 
dignity is put in war itself, and even philosophers have eulogized it as a certain ennoblement 
of humanity, unmindful of the saying of a certain Greek, ‘War is bad in that it makes more 
evil people than it takes away’ (Zef 8: 365).
24 I have discussed the relevance of enthusiasm for Kant’s philosophy of history in Lea 
Ypi, ‘On revolution in Kant and Marx’, Political Theory (forthcoming).
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‘cultivate the less necessary elements of culture, science and art’ and main-
tain the former ‘in a state of oppression, bitter work and little enjoyment’ 
(KdU 5: 432).
In Kant’s earlier essays the development and promotion of commercial 
relations was perceived as beneficial to the trajectory of moral develop-
ment of human beings. Conflict amongst states was seen as determined 
mostly by their ambition for power, the issue of internal social unrest and 
dissatisfaction amongst different social classes hardly received a mention, 
and the promotion of trade and commercial relations was constituted an 
antidote to war and led to the promotion of peaceful interdependence 
among nations. In the Critique of Judgement Kant’s analysis takes a differ-
ent form: the development of commercial sociability is itself seen as part 
of conflicts, both within the state (due to the dissatisfaction of oppression 
between classes) and between states (due to their ambition, greed, and 
commercial rivalries). The type of political relation able to put an end to 
this conflict is not necessarily one in which each individual is left alone 
to pursue his own good in the hope that his isolated activities will have 
a positive impact on the welfare of the whole. The problem becomes one 
of designing political institutions able to administer justice impartially 
for all concerned. Enlightenment is thus no longer expected from the 
progressive moderation of political elites, as we saw earlier, but from the 
learning process enacted by revolutionary events realizing specific princi-
ples of right and justice.
All these passages are consistent with the development of Kant’s reflec-
tions on the role of the state, its relevance in promoting principles of 
justice, and the importance of human agency in transforming political 
institutions so that moral predispositions are promoted. They also make 
sense in the light of developments in Kant’s analysis of teleology, placing 
more emphasis on the artificial intervention of human beings than on the 
benign assistance provided by nature to cultivate its innate predisposi-
tions. While Kant’s earlier essays on history did reflect on the necessity of 
coercive laws, and also of a cosmopolitan political body, for placing col-
lective constraints on freedom, the nature of the principles according to 
which such transformations ought to take place was never considered in 
any detail. Kant’s later account of human nature, his clarification of the 
form and role of teleological principles in human reflection about pro-
gress, and the new emphasis placed on the necessity for moral imperatives 
in reforming political institutions required a much more sophisticated 
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analysis of the nature of the state, its relation to rights, and the kind of 
representation required to ensure that institutions expressed the collective 
will of those subjected to them.
4.5 The Critique of Colonialism and 
Commercial Relations
The developments in Kant’s philosophy of history experienced during the 
1790s brought with them also a new evaluation of the relationship between 
colonialism and commercial relations. As we saw above, the essay on uni-
versal history was silent on the negative effects of unregulated commer-
cial expansion and unambiguously celebrated the role of Western states in 
progressively establishing a universal legal order subjecting to European 
rule all other societies. Rooted in a hierarchical account of human races 
and supported by a stadial theory of human history, such an account cul-
minated in the allegedly superior age of commercial relations.
Kant’s later political writings are more nuanced on this point. Both the 
Doctrine of Right and his essay on perpetual peace revisit the traditional 
right of hospitality, central to the justification of commercial expan-
sion since the writings of Vitoria, but take it in a different, anti-imperial, 
direction. The right to hospitality, also labelled as ‘cosmopolitan’ right, is 
limited to the conditions under which one can ‘seek’ commercial interac-
tion with others without expecting to be treated with hostility for having 
made such an attempt. Although such a right protects human’s natural 
interest in sociability and can be abused by those resisting commercial 
expansion, if one contrasts the alleged unsociable behaviour displayed 
by ‘barbarian’ peoples with that of states pursuing commercial profit, 
the latter, Kant emphasizes, is much more striking in its brutality. ‘[T] he 
inhospitable behaviour of civilized, especially commercial, states in our 
part of the world, the injustice they show in visiting foreign lands and 
peoples (which with them is tantamount to conquering them) goes to 
horrifying lengths,’ he declares. ‘When America, the negro countries, the 
Spice Islands, the Cape, and so forth were discovered’ they were consid-
ered ‘countries belonging to no one, since they counted the inhabitants 
as nothing’. The foreign soldiers called up under the pretext of setting up 
trading posts only brought with them ‘oppression of inhabitants, incite-
ment of the various Indian states to widespread wars, famine, rebellions, 
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treachery, and the whole litany of troubles that oppress the human race’ 
(ZeF 8: 358).
The critique of chartered commercial companies and their complicity 
in the oppressive actions of European states in the New World were far 
from original in the late eighteenth century. To take one relevant exam-
ple, Adam Smith, often simplistically interpreted as a mere apologist of 
free markets and commercial expansion, denounced the pathologies of 
joint-stock trading companies for their corruption, mismanagement, and 
detrimental effects on the proper development of commercial sociability. 
In doing so he focused on the same examples as Kant: the East Indies, the 
Spice Islands, and the activity of English and Dutch trading companies.25 
He highlighted the contradictions embedded in the activities of agen-
cies who could not be trusted to be able to both pursue private profits and 
commit to acting as government representatives serving the interests of a 
whole country. Although Smith remained much more sceptical than Kant 
on the prospects of developing appropriate juridical and political relations 
to contain such contradictions and tensions,26 the critique of colonialism 
developed from a critical account of chartered commercial companies 
was clearly common.
Kant’s views are distinctive in placing the critique of colonialism in 
the context of a theory of justice which on the one hand develops themes 
already present in his earlier essays on history, on the other hand departs 
from them in significant directions. The Doctrine of Right, published in 
1797, is particularly clear on the limits of unilateral appropriation of dis-
tant territories, and the conditions under which one can make rightful use 
of a particular piece of land and its resources. In contrast to Conjectural 
beginnings of human history, where agriculture and the farmer’s attempt 
to protect the ‘fruits of his labour’ triggers the need to establish a com-
mon political authority guaranteeing one’s property entitlements (MAM 
8: 119), the Doctrine of Right mentions the role of labour and agricultural 
activity only to dismiss it as a criteria of appropriation: ‘whoever expends 
25 For an excellent discussion of this critique, see Sankar Muthu, ‘Adam Smith’s critique of 
international trading companies—Theorizing “Globalization” in the age of enlightenment’, 
Political Theory 36, no. 2 (2008), pp. 185–212.
26 For an analysis of Smith’s scepticism on institutional solutions to international conflict, 
see Fonna Forman-Barzilai, ‘Adam Smith as globalization theorist’, Critical Review 14, no. 4 
(2000), pp. 391–419.
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his labor on land that was not already his has lost his pains and toil to who 
was first’ (MdS 6: 269).
Moreover, in the Doctrine of Right Kant seems to have abandoned 
the stadial theory of history that characterized Conjectural beginnings 
of human history. In the latter, commercial society was seen as the last, 
superior, stage of a development that begins with ‘the savage life of hunt-
ers’, continues into a ‘comfortable’ and ‘secure’ pastoral existence, and 
follows the triumph of the agricultural way of life over the shepherding 
one. The Doctrine of Right displays a more tolerant attitude towards a 
variety of ways of life. Kant argues, for example, that nomadic peoples 
may be entitled to common possession of the land, citing Mongolia as 
an example (MdS 6: 265), and he also insists that groups with different 
life styles can legitimately resist the imposition of a different method of 
interacting with the land, provided they do not interfere with each other. 
To mention one example: a hunting people, Kant says, can resist a pas-
turing or farming people since ‘as long as they keep within their bounda-
ries the way they want to live on their land is up to their own discretion’ 
(MdS 6: 266).
The implications of these reflections for the critique of colonialism are 
unambiguous. Since nomadic people are entitled to remain on the land 
that they occupy, they also have a right to exclude others whose attempts 
to enter into relations with them violate principles of justice. Settlement is 
legitimate provided it does not encroach with the claim of native peoples 
to use the land in accordance with their habitual practices. Kant says that 
‘if these people are shepherds or hunters (like the Hottentots, the Tungusi, 
or most of the American Indian nations) who depend for their sustenance 
on great open regions, this settlement may not take place by force but only 
by contract’. Moreover, the kind of contract required is one that ‘does not 
take advantage of the ignorance of those inhabitants with respect to ced-
ing their lands’ (MdS 6: 353).
It is clear here that trade has to be placed in the context of rightful 
relations and can no longer be relied upon to pave the way to a peaceful 
political order. Whilst in Kant’s earlier writings, commercial sociability 
was the tool through which nature guaranteed the emergence of politi-
cal institutions protecting individual claims to property, here such insti-
tutions take precedence and are themselves a condition for the assertion 
of property rights and the development of commercial relations. Global 
interdependence implies that the absence of justice in one part of the earth 
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is immediately felt in another and efforts to resist such injustice are inter-
twined.27 This argument differs significantly in both content and structure 
from the one we analyzed in Idea for a universal history which empha-
sized that it is hindering the individual pursuit of welfare that will threaten 
the stability of the whole international system thereby dictating an end to 
war. The passage in Perpetual Peace where Kant articulates this thought is 
well known:
Since the (narrower or wider) community of the nations of the earth has now gone 
so far that a violation of right on one place of the earth is felt in all, the idea of a 
cosmopolitan right is no fantastic and exaggerated way of representing right; it 
is, instead, a supplement to the unwritten code of the right of a state and the right 
of nations necessary for the sake of any public rights of human beings and so for 
perpetual peace. (ZeF 8:360)
It is important therefore to insist that although political institutions are 
central to Kant’s theory of human progress throughout his philosophical 
trajectory, both in the essay on history and in his later political writings, 
the analysis of the conditions under which they can emerge appears more 
sophisticated. At first, their justification is embedded in a narrative of 
gradual moral development out of the refinement of particular psycho-
logical predispositions, guaranteed by the benign intervention of nature. 
Although, Kant never completely abandons such references to nature, 
they cease to play a systematically important role, once the justification of 
the principles that allow us to think about nature as a teleologically organ-
ized system is modified.28
To see this point, we can focus on the interpretation of passages in 
Perpetual Peace where Kant still refers to commercial relations but in a 
slightly different perspective. Discussing the possible mechanism by 
which nations will join each other in the creation of a cosmopolitan condi-
tion, Kant argues that ‘it is the spirit of commerce (Handelsgeist), which 
cannot coexist with war and which sooner or later takes hold of every 
nation’ that will bring together nations. But the argument is qualified: it 
applies to those nations that ‘the concept of cosmopolitan right will not 
have secured against violence and war’ (ZeF 8: 368). Since ‘the power of 
money may well be the most reliable of all the powers (means) subordinate 
27 See Muthu’s chapter in this volume.
28 I have tried to account for the persistence of such references to nature in Ypi, ‘Natura 
daedala rerum?’
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to that of a state, states find themselves compelled (admittedly not through 
incentives of morality) to promote honorable peace and, whenever war 
threatens to break out anywhere in the world, to prevent it by mediation, 
just as if they were in a permanent league for this purpose’ (ZeF 8: 368). 
And yet the kind of assurance that nature provides here is not one that 
can allow us to conclude that a change in the desired direction will cer-
tainly occur; it is certainly not, Kant emphasizes, ‘adequate for predicting 
its future’. What he is interested in is a reflective endorsement of a pattern 
that allows us, for practical purposes, to think about the world as if it were 
teleologically ordered thus making it ‘a duty to work to toward this (not 
merely chimerical) end’ (ZeF 8:368).
It turns out then that commercial relations are not important because 
they guarantee an end to war or prepare the entrance to a peaceful inter-
national order. Indeed, as the passage above reveals, Kant thinks that 
the commercial spirit plays a role precisely in those cases where war (for 
whatever reason) ceases to deliver the predicted outcome of motivating 
nations to entering into reciprocally rightful relations. Commerce is for 
Kant simply another route through which we might explain the emer-
gence of global interdependence and communication; it no longer demar-
cates a privileged set of social relations or indicates an intermediate stage 
between a condition of conflict and one of perpetual peace. If commercial 
relations simply illustrate the empirical conditions under which cosmo-
politan right can be established, there is no need for a moralized defence of 
them. The descriptive narrative Kant provides here is consistent with his 
explicit endorsement of protectionist measures, including the protection-
ism of nations like China or Japan when refusing to enter into commercial 
relations with European merchants. Kant no longer defends commercial 
relations from a normative perspective, he simply invokes them to explain 
under what circumstances people from different countries can come into 
contact with each other and create the empirical conditions that might in 
the future favour the emergence of principles of right. What really matters 
for his position is the duty to create just political institutions able to rem-
edy the conflicts present in such conditions of interdependence, and only 
the actions of humans themselves are ultimately able to account for the 
possibility of this duty being realized.
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4.6 Conclusion
We may wonder at this point what happened to the caution with which 
Kant approached the issue of humans legislating for themselves, and to the 
pessimistic remarks on the human beings’ need for a master with which 
with which we began our analysis. It seems that Kant views on this matter 
have come full circle: although in the later political writings the idea that 
out of the crooked wood of humankind nothing entirely straight can be 
produced is still present, Kant also believes in the force of moral impera-
tives to redirect the course of politics without need for further support 
from nature. The following passage from Perpetual Peace directly con-
nects to some of the issues concerning the ability of humans to govern 
themselves raised by the essay on universal history:
It is then said that he who once has power in his hands will not let the people pre-
scribe laws for him. A state that is once in possession [of the power] not to be 
subject to any external laws will not make itself dependent upon the tribunal of 
other states with respect to the way it is to pursue its right against them; and even 
a continent, if it feels itself superior to another that does not otherwise stand in its 
way, will not leave unused the means of strengthening its power by plundering or 
even conquering it and so all the plans of theory for the right of a state, the right 
of nations, and cosmopolitan right dissolve into ineffectual, impracticable ideals.
But the way in which this challenge is addressed illustrates the straight-
forward answers Kant’s later writings provide to the question of what guar-
antees that human beings will make progress in the direction of building 
common political institutions:
Admittedly, if there were no freedom and no moral law based upon it and every-
thing that happens or can happen is instead the mere mechanism of nature, then 
politics (as the art of making use of this mechanism for governing human beings) 
would be the whole of practical wisdom, and the concept of right would be an 
empty thought. But if one finds it indispensably necessary to join the concept of 
right with politics, and even to raise it to the limiting condition of politics, it must 
be granted that the two can be united.
The only plausible guarantee of moral development is then political 
progress conforming to the duty to promote principles of right. As Kant’s 
later reflections indicate: to ask whether human beings will ever take that 
imperative seriously requires examining whether there is any evidence 
that they might have done so in the past and invoking that evidence as a 
possible, weak, assurance that they might continue to act in the same way 
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in the future.29 The French Revolution provides an example or sign of that 
tendency and it is instructive precisely because it is directed by human 
agents. Out of the state, and out of the attempt to build state institutions 
that reflect the collective will of all citizens, there are no guarantees that 
moral progress will be possible but ‘it can be required of the one in power 
that he at least take to heart the maxim that such an alteration is necessary, 
in order to keep constantly approaching the end’ (ZeF 8; 372).
Commercial sociability therefore no longer indicates a privileged 
instance of human communication, facilitated by nature’s will to promote 
the development of human moral predispositions, nor does it provide a 
route of transition from conflicts in the international sphere to improved 
political institutions. The development in the analysis of teleology that 
Kant completed during the 1790s implied that he could no longer rely on 
a spontaneous mechanism of coordination supported by an inherently 
beneficial teleological narrative clarifying how human beings can govern 
themselves collectively despite the potential for corruption inherent in 
their nature. This development, combined with the increasingly sophisti-
cated analysis of the state that Kant elaborated during the 1790s provoked 
a return to a more artificial account of the development of political institu-
tions, in line more with the contribution of Hobbes and Rousseau to an 
understanding of rights and politics than with that of his Scottish philo-
sophical heroes. As we have seen, a similar development also paved the 
way to a novel critique of European politics and trade, a clear condemna-
tion of colonial exploitation, and a renewed emphasis on the legitimate 
intervention of sovereign states to contain the damaging expansion of 
commercial relations. It is easy to see, in light of these reflections, why 
Fichte’s advocacy of the closed commercial state was perceived by his sup-
porters to follow naturally from Kant’s Perpetual Peace.30 But with that 
development, a new chapter in the history of ideas begins to unfold.
29 See on this issue Ypi, “On revolution in Kant and Marx.”
30 See on this issue, Isaac Nakhimovsky, The closed commercial state:  Perpetual peace 
and commercial society from Rousseau to Fichte (Princeton, N.J.; Woodstock:  Princeton 
University Press, 2011).
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